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THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER AMERICAN MUNICIPAL LAW:
A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
WITH public consideration of the United Nations centered on its handling
of broad international issues, analysis of how the organization's head-
quarters will function under American law has been left largely to munici-
palities and private parties likely to be directly affected. For those believing
themselves adversely interested general uncertainty over the status of the
U.N. has made it easy to conjure up a host of complexities likely to arise
from the location of its headquarters in this country.' Leaving argumenta-
tive dissertations to political scientists and others, this discussion is designed
to collate the available material on this relatively obscure facet of the U.N.
-the jural relationship of the organization to its territorial surroundings.
To the extent that the U.N.'s position in the United States is bound up
with questions of fact, such as how many employees the organization will
eventually have, where its permanent headquarters will be located, and how
large an area it will require, definitive answers will come only with time.
2
1. E.g., "The UNO in Greenwich?," a handbill distributed by opponents to the inclu-
sion of part of Greenwich in the permanent headquarters zone, pictures the town's water
supply endangered; the local brooks turned into nauseating eyesores by U.N.'s sewage;
taxes increased 20%; 50,000 persons immune from all local law; and compensation of less
than 50 % for land taken by the U.N. And see N. Y. Times, March 26, 1946, p. 3, col. 8 for
reference by a Westchester official to the presence near New York City of U.N. headquarters
as constituting a danger to national security. See also Time, Feb. 18, 1946, p. 23; N. Y
Times, Feb. 20,1946, p. 2, col. 6.
2. Neither the size nor exact location of the permanent headquarters zone have been
determined. The Preparatory Commission of the United Nations recommended that it be
in the eastern part of the United States, and set up an Interim Committee to recommend
exact sites. United Nations Document, PC/CD/9, Dec. 22, 1945. This committee narrowed
the possible areas to the vicinity of Boston and New York City, and appointed a Site In-
spection Group to visit the United States and make definite recommendations. United Na-
tions Document, PC/ICH/W2/Rev. 1, Dec. 28, 1945. The Group inspected possible sites
in January, 1946, and recommended a 42-square mile area in Westchester, N. Y., and Fair-
field, Conn., counties. Time, Feb. 11, 1946, p. 18. The General Assembly did not adopt
this recommendation. Instead, it voted merely to establish the permanent headquarters
s6mewhere in Westchester and/or Fairfield; and a Headquarters Commission was set up to
recommend to the General Assembly, when it reconvenes in September, exact locations
based on alternate plans for a zone of 2, 5, 10, 20, and 40 square miles. Resolution Adopted
by General Assembly as to Procedure for Selecting a Site in Westchester County, New York,
and/or Fairfield County, Connecticut, Feb. 14, 1946; N. Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1946, p. 1, col. 1.
See also Report of U. S. Delegation to the first Part of the First Session of the General As-
sembly of the U.N., Dept. of State Publication No. 2484 (1946) 15-17. This'new commission
first met on May 7. N.Y. Times, May 8, 1946, p. 4, col. 2.
There have been reports, however, that local opposition and lack of greater cooperation
by the United States government might induce the organization to choose a site in a different
part of this country or even in another country. Newsweek, March 18, 1946, p. 23; N. Y.
Times, Apr. 14, 1946, § 4, p. 3, col. 7.
In any event, it is estimated that three to five years will be required to prepare the
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The legal aspects of the problem may be analyzed, however, in terms of (1)
the bases of the U.N.'s status (2) the nature of that status and (3) the spe-
cial considerations involved in the establishment of a permanent head-
quarters zone.
I.
Legal sources. The basic sources of the U.N.'s legal character in the
United States are international law,3 the U.N. Charter,4 and the recent In-
ternational Organizations Immunities Act.5 In addition, the U.N. has sub-
mitted to the United States, for negotiation and eventual adoption as a
Treaty or Executive Agreement, a draft convention which would regulate
its status in this country with particular regard to the problems of the per-
manent headquarters zone.G
Permanent international organizations formed to exercke even limited
functions outside the capacity of individual states are relatively new to
permanent zone for occupancy; present plans call for interim headquarters remaining, in the
meantime, at Lake Success, N. Y., and at the former World's Fair site at Fluhing Meadows,
N.Y. N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1946, p. 1, col. 7; id. Apr. 12, 1946, p. 1, col. 8; id. Apr. 19, 1946,
p. 14, col. 2.
3. When unrestricted by statutory limitations, American courts apply the customs
and principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The Paquete Habana,
175 U. S. 677 (1900); The Nereide, 9 Cranch. 388 (U. S. 1815); 1 HiDE, IrTzlUaATiO!.AL
LAw (2d ed. 1945) 17.
4. The Charter was submitted to the Senate as a treaty and approved July 28, 1945,
by a vote of 89 to 2. 91 CONG. REc. 8329 (1945). Upon deposit of the necezsary number of
ratifications, it became effective Oct. 24, 1945. 13 DEr. oF STATE BrtL. 679 (1945).
5. Pub. L. No. 291, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 29, 1945) Tit. I; Exrzc. Ormrn No.
9698 (Feb. 19, 1946) 11 FED. REG. 1809. Discussed infra.
6. There are really two proposed conventions, one dealing with privileges and immu-
nities of the United Nations and its personnel, the other treating the establishment of the
permanent headquarters zone. The first has been proposed for accezsion by all member
nations; the second would be between the United Nations and the United States alone, but
includes the provisions of the privileges and immunities convention as an Appendix.
The zone convention has gone through three drafts. The first was prepared before it
was known in what country the permanent headquarters would be located. United Nations
Document, PC/G/24, Dec. 14, 1945. After the appropriate committee of the Preparatory
Commission had recommended that headquarters be located in the United Statez, the
Canadian delegation prepared a second and more specific draft which was accepted by the
Preparatory Commission and submitted to the General Assembly. United Nations Docu-
ment, PC/G/31, Dec. 20, 1945; PC/G/36, Dec. 21, 1945. The General A-sembly incor-
porated additional revisions in the present draft and submitted it to the Secretary-General
for use as a basis of discussions with the United States. Resolution of the General Assembly
as to Negotiation of Arrangements for Control of the Area to be Selected as a Site for the
United Nations Headquarters, Feb. 13, 1946. American officials participated informally in
preparation of the latest draft, but neither the United States nor the United Nations is
committed to its provisions. A ten-nation advisory group appointed by the Secretary-
General has started negotiation of the convention with State Department officials. N. Y.
Times, lay 16, 1946, p. 9, col. 1.
It is not known whether the zone convention as finally negotiated v,11l be approved as a
treaty (two-thirds vote of the Senate) or an executive agreement (majority vote of both
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international law,7 and the status of the U.N. will find little definition from
this body of jurisprudence. Courts have seldom had occasion to determine
the legal attributes of such organizations ; and writers have generally avoided
classifying them in terms of traditional concepts-such as states, federations,
colonies, alliances-and have passed over their status under the municipal
law of the countries within which they operate.' The League of Nations,
the organization most analogous to the U.N., has been characterized as
sui generis,'0 and Switzerland and the League tacitly recognized this view
houses). For an argument that the legal effect would be identical, see McDougal and Lang,
Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments
of National Policy (1945) 54 YALE L. J. 181 and 534. For a contrary view, see Borchard,
Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply (1945) 54 YALE L. J. 616.
The general convention on privileges and immunities has been approved by the General
Assembly and will become effective as regards each member nation on deposit of an instru-
ment of accession. Both conventions have been mimeographed by the State Department
under the heading, "Documents Relating to the Selection of the Site for the Permanent
Headquarters of the United Nations in the United States and the Arrangements for the
Control of the Area Comprising the Site," unnumbered and undated.
7. Commissions were set up under the Treaty of Vienna in 1815 to execute the treaty
provisions relating to navigation on European rivers. WooLF, INTERNATIONAL GOVERN-
MENT (1916) 104, n. 4. But it was not until the last half of the nineteenth century that
permanent international administrative bodies began to be formed. Since then such bodies
have been constituted to deal with a wide variety of economic, scientific and cultural sub-
jects. See Reinsch, International Unions and Their Administration (1907) 1 Ams. J. INT. L.
579; 1 OPPENHEIm, INTERNATIONAL LAw (5th ed. 1937) App. A.
8. The paucity of judicial precedent at once contributes to theoretical uncertainty
and shows that it has not in fact hampered the operation of the organizations. The District
of Columbia Municipal Court on Dec. 16, 1925, dismissed attachment proceedings against
the Pan American Union for lack of jurisdiction; the Union's brief contended that the sov-
ereign status of the Union's members gave it immunity from the process of American courts.
Penfield, The Legal Status of the Pan American Union (1926) 20 Am. J. INT. L. 257. A suit
against the International Institute of Agriculture for payments allegedly due an employee
was dismissed by direction of the Italian Court of Cassation on the grounds that Italian
courts had no jurisdiction over the Institute except when it consented. International Insti-
tute of Agriculture v. Profili, Italian Court of Cassation, Feb. 26, 1931, ANNUAL Dso. or
PUB. INT. L. CASES 1929-30 (1935) 413. A building contractor's claim against the League
of Nations was rejected on the merits but doubt was expressed that Swiss courts had juris-
diction over suits against the League. Schmidlin v. Soci~t6 des Nations, Court of Civ. Just.
of Geneva, Feb. 6, 1925, 21 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIvA 103.
9. What discussion there has been has centered around (a) whether the organizations
have "international legal personality," i.e., whether they can hold property, contract, sue,
etc. and (b) the privileges and immunities of their personnel. See 1 OPENIIEIM, op. cit.
supra note 7, 676-8, especially 678 n. 2; EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1932)
238-9, 268-9; NORmANDIN, Du STATUT JURIDIQUE DES ASsociATIONS INTERNATIONALES
(1926) 176-87. It has been remarked that international organizations have been "baptized
rather than defined." EAGLETON, supra, at 239. For a thorough consideration of the status
of their personnel, see BASDEVANT, LES FONCTIONNAIRES INTERNATIONAUX (1931).
10. 1 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 7, at 306 el seg.; see also 1 BUSTAMANTE Y SIRVEN,
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1934) 492-6; Ames, What Is the League of Nations? (1928)
22 Am. POL. Scr. REv. 706; cf. Corbett, What is the League of Nations? (1924) BRIT. Y. B.
INT. L. 119; Voorhees, The League of Nations: A Corporation, Not a Superstate (1926) 20 Am.
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by resorting to a modus vivendi to regulate their relations." Although it
would thus appear that the U.N. derives neither "sovereignty" nor an easily
predictable legal status from international law, it nonetheless seems likely
that even in the absence of legislation or specific international agreement
courts would clothe the organization with legal characteristics deemed es-
sential to the performance of the functions for which it was created. Failure
to do so would mean acceptance of the premise that the member nations
were either unable or did not intend to create a workable institution.
The Charter commits the United States as a signatory to provide the U.N.
and its personnel with legal capacity and privileges and immunities "neces-
sary" for the fulfilment of its purposes.'2 The International Organizations
POL. Sci. REv. S47; Harriman, League of Nations a Rudimentary Superstate (1927) 21 An.
POL. Sci. Rnv. 137.
11. The League Covenant contained two provisions relative to the League's status
under municipal law: (a) representatives of members and officials of the League when en-
gaged in League business would enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities and (b) the
buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by representatives of
members would be inviolable COVEN.= OF THE LruskaE OF NATIO:5, .Art. 7, §5 4, 5.
The League and Switzerland did not see eye to eye on the applicability of these provi-
sions, and it was only after long negotiation that the nodns rirendi as vsigned in 1926. Sig-
nificantly, the reporter introducing it to the League Council included the remark, "Avolding
all discussion on the legal interpretation of Article 7, par. 4, of the Covenant, the agreement
coritains practical rules.... ." League of Nations Document c. 553. 1926. V. See also
1 OPPENHEM, op. cit. supra note 7, at 303, n. 3.
By the vwdus vitetdi the Swiss government recognized that the League had "intera-
tional personality and legal capacity"; that it v,'as immune from suit; that its archives were
inviolable; that no public official could enter its buildings without permission; that no taxes
could be imposed on its property or assets; that imports for the League's use were exempt
from customs; that salaries of alien officials of the first tvo classes (an arbitrary division by
rank) would be tax-free; that officials of the first class would have complete immunity from
suit and those of the second class immunity for official acts; and that the League's couriers,
would have the same status as couriers for foreign governments. Salaries of officials of
Swiss nationality were made exempt only from local taxes; and Swiss officials were to be
exempted from military service only where their departure would hurt the League. League
of Nations Document c. 555. 1926. V.
12. "The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its pur-
poses." UNiTED NATIoNs CtRTER, Art. 104.
"The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges
and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes." Id. Art. 105, § 1.
"Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organiza-
tion shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent
exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization." Id. Art. 105, § 2.
An added moral obligation to extend assistance to the United Nations in the establish-
ment of its headquarters in this country was created by a Concurrent Resolution of Congres,
Dec. 10 and 11, 1945, inviting the organization to locate its seat here. The Resolution was
transmitted to the Preparatory Commission just before a decision was to be reached on
locating the headquarters in Europe or the United States. 91 CoNG. REC. 11930, 11969-70
(1945); Record of Eleventh Meeting, Committee S, Preparatory Commission, De. 15, 1945.
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Im'munities Act,13 which has been applied to the U.N. by Executive Order, 14
is the only step thus far taken by the United States to implement this
pledge.15 And even without a convention, further Congressional action rea-
sonably designed to implement the Charter pledge would probably be up-
held by the courts. Determination of what measures are appropriate for
that purpose might well be deemed a "political question" to be left to the
discretion of the executive and legislative branches. 16 If not, courts might
reason that negotiation of the Charter fell within the comprehensive federal
power in foreign relations;17 that as a treaty the Charter is now part of the
supreme law of the land;18 and that measures implementing it need only
pass the test of being necessary and proper, 9 which depends again on the
functional standard set up in the Charter.
However, the convention method of achieving legal status offers some
advantages. From the U.N.'s standpoint, a convention would add an aura
of sanctity and permanence to the arrangements 20 and provide a more
13. See note 5 supra.
14. See note 5 supra.
15. See note 5 supra. The Act recognizes the capacity of "public international organi-
zations" to contract, hold property, and bring suit; and grants the organizations and their
personnel various immunities from suit, taxes, and immigration restrictions. As applied to
the United Nations, the Act is discussed in more detail infra, passim.
Other organizations thus far brought within the provisions of the Act are the Food and
Agricultural Organization; the International Labor Office; the Pan American Union; and
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. EXEC. ORDER No. 9698
(Feb. 19, 1946) 11 FED. REG. 1809 (1946).
16. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30 (1945); Jones v. United States,
137 U. S. 202 (1890); Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (U. S. 1829); WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITti-
T NAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1930) 567-70. Corwin refers to the "settled
reluctance of the Court to thrust its oar into the turbulent waters of foreign policy-making."
CoRwixn, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION (1944) 24.
1 17. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936); Burnet v.
Brooks, 288 U. S. 378 (1933); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893); see
Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory
(1946) 55 Yale L. J. 467; WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 16, at 61-2, 228-9, 240-1; CoRwIN,
op. cit. supra note 16, at 17-9.
18. ". . . all treaties made . . . under the authority of the United States shall be the
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything In
the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." U. S. CoNsT. Art.
VI, § 2. See WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra, note 16, at 240-5.
". .. state law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provi-
sions of, a treaty or of an international compact or agreement." Mr. Justice Douglas in
United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 230-1 (1942). See also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S.
416 (1920).
19. U. S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, clause 18. WILLOUGHBY, Op. Cit. supra note 16, at 60-1,
242-3. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109 (1901); see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 432
(1919).
20. Either a Treaty or Executive Agreement would create a strong moral obligation in
the United States to adhere to its provisions, but could be modified or annulled by Act of
Congress. WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 16, at 236; see Van der Weyde v. Ocean Trans-
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forceful example to countries slow in granting its promised status. More-
over, since the terms of a convention would be on the level of supreme law
of the land, 21 the legislative and executive branches of our government could
carry out convention promises without risking litigation to determine
whether each measure was "necessary" to the United Nations as required
by the Charter.
II
Legal status of the U.N.-the organization and its personnel. The Interna-
tional Organizations Immunities Act gives the U.N. the capacity to con-
tract, to acquire and dispose of property, and to institute legal proceedings ;-2
makes the organization and its property and assets immune from suit or
process except as immunity is expressly waived by contract or for the pur-
pose of any proceeding;2 exempts it from federal taxes on income, propert,
communications, and transportation, and from customs duties on official
imports; 4 exempts it from the withholding provisions of the personal income
tax 25 and from contributions under the Federal Insurance Contributions
port Co., 297 U. S. 114 (1936); Piegeon River Co. v. Cox, 291 U. S. 138, lCO (1934); Ccal: v.
United States, 28S U. S. 102, 120 (1933).
21. See note 18 supra. This would hold true even if the convention should take the
form of an executive agreement. United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
22. Pub. L. No. 291, supra note 5, Tit. I, § 2(a).
23. The U.N.'s immunity from suit is defined as the same "as is enjoyed by foreign
governments." Id. § 2(b). In practice this seems to mean almost complete immunity.
Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School, Con pcience of Courts irn Regard
to Foreign States: Draft Convention, -with Comment (1932), 26 Am. J. Iz,r. L. Surr. 475,
527, 540, 543, 548, 560, 569, 645; see The Exchange v. MlcFaddon, 7 Cranch. 116, 13G-7
(U. S. 1812); Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N. Y. 372,
375-6, 138 N. E. 24, 26 (1923).
If, as seems unlikely, the U.N. should engage in private business, it would probably be
subject to suit in respect to such business or property held in connection therevith. Recearch
in International Law of the Harvard Law School, supra, at 572-4; and execution might icue
against such property. Id. at 700-14.
It has been argued that states should be subject to suits to determine interests even in
property used for diplomatic purposes, the state receiving ample protection from the pro-
hilition against the enforcement of any court order against such property. Id. at 578, 645,
689-714.
24. Pub. L. No. 291, supra note 5, Tit. I, amending Ixr. REv. CoDE t 116(c), 3466(a),
3469(0(1), 3475(b)(1) (1939). The exemption from customs is the same as that "accorded
. . . to foreign governments." Id. § 2(d). Under the Secretary of the Treasury's discretion
to "make such rules and regulations as may be necessary" to carry out the administrative
provisions of the Tariff Act, exemption from customs duties is extended to official imports
of diplomatic establishments of those countries granting the United States reciprocal ex-
emptions. 46 STAT. 759 (1930), 19 U. S. C. § 1624 (1940); CoDE FrD. REG., Tit. 19, § 833
(1939). Presumably exemption will be extended to the United Nations outright cince it is
not in a position to discriminate against the United States.
Under the Draft Convention, the United Nations vwould undertake not to cell articles
imported duty-free. Draft Convention, App. II, Art. 2, § 7(b).
25. Pub. L. No. 291, supra note 5, Tit. I, § 4(e) amending lzx. REv. CoDE § 1621
(a) (5) (1939).
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Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act;2 and accords its communica-
tions the same favored treatment as those of foreign governments.
27
The draft convention includes these provisions.2 In addition it proposes
U.N. exemption, from state and local taxes;2 freedom from exchange con-
trols;" submission to a referee appointed by the International Court of
Justice of disputes between the U.N. and the United States over interpreta-
tion of the convention; 3' and a U.N. pledge to "make provisions for appro-
priate modes of settlement" of claims by private parties against the organi-
zation or its agents whenever immunity from suit is invoked. 32 If the
League's experience is repeated, the U.N. will find it desirable to establish
its own administrative tribunal for settlement of employee grievances. 33
The positive capacities to contract, hold property, and bring suit give the
U.N. legal personality similar to that of other "persons" before American
law. Since operation as an independent body would otherwise be impossible,
it is probable that even in the absence of a statutory grant the courts would
26. Id. § 4(c), (d) amending Int. Rev. Code §§ 1426(b), 1607(c) (1939). United Nations
employees, as a counterpart, will not receive benefits under the Social Security Act. Id.
§ 5(a) amending 53 STAT. 1373, § 209(b) (1939), 42 U. S. C. § 409(b) (1940).
27. Id. § 2(d).
28. Draft Convention, App. II, Art. I, II §§ 2, 3,4, 7, 111.
29. The provision is phrased to achieve exemption "from all direct taxes." Id. App. II,
Art. II, § 7. In addition, the United States would whenever possible arrange for remission
of excise and sales taxes on United Nations purchases for official use. Id. App. II, Art. II,
§ 8. For its permanent headquarters, and presumably for the interim one, the United Na.
tions intends to contract for public services such as gas, water, electricity, drainage, and
refuse collection. Id. Art. VII, § 28. Where services are supplied by local governments and
not private corporations, the contracts will probably be negotiated to compensate at least
in part for loss of revenue from local property taxes. A resolution of Feb. 13, 1946, by the
Headquarters Committee of the General Assembly promised "friendly consideration to any
problems . . . in connection with . . . tax, revenue, and other problems affecting the
localities involved" when the permanent headquarters site is selected. The Nassau County
Executive has acknowledged the United Nations' willingness to pay a "fair share" of local
taxes in connection with the use of the Sperry Plant at Lake Success, N. Y., as an interim
office building. N. Y. Times, April 12, 1946, p. 2, col. 7. It is also possible that increased
assessment values of land adjacent to the permanent headquarters will make up for loss of
property taxes from the zone itself.
30. The organization could hold funds of any kind, operate accounts in any currency,
and transfer its funds as desired. Id. App. II, Art. II, § 5.
31. Id. Art. X, § 39. In the course of proceedings by the referee either party could ask,
through the General Assembly, for an advisory opinion of the International Court on any
legal question arising. The referee would render a final decision "having regard to the
opinion of the Court." Id. § 40. In case of a dispute between the U.N. and a state, the
state's interests would presumably be represented through the United States. The U.N.
could not sue the state. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934).
32. Id. App. II, Art. VIII, § 29(a), (b). Under the International Organizations Im.
munities Act, employees of the U.N. are immune from suit for acts performed in their
official capacity. Pub. L. No. 291, supra note 5, Tit. I, § 7(b).
33. The League's tribunal dealt exclusively with claims under employment contracts.
It was established in 1928. Ames, supra note 10, at 709-10.
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have recognized such powers as inherent in the organization or implied from
the United States pledge to provide "necessary" legal capacity.
The proposed jurisdictional and fiscal immunities correspond with those
accorded foreign governments.Z4 Justification for immunity from suit rests,
however, not on concepts of sovereignty or extraterritoriality, but on the
argument that the U.N.'s independence would be prejudiced by subjection
to judgment and execution by courts of a member nation and its efficiency
impaired by possible harrassing actions. In extending immunity from taxa-
tion, the International Organizations Immunities Act probably does no more
than anticipate conclusions which courts would reach under international
law. The U.N.'s sole source of revenue is assessments on member nations;
a tax on the U.N. would in effect be a tax on those nations; and sovereign
states and their official property are generally considered beyond the taxing
jurisdiction of other states."5 Besides, it would seem incongruous for the
United States to deny the top organization for world cooperation the same
immunity regularly accorded to domestic educational, fraternal, and chari-
table institutions.5
While submission to a referee of disputes between the United Nations and
the United States seems satisfactory, and the settlement of employee
claims is properly a U.N. responsibility, the United States should insist on
provision of specific machinery to protect the interests of individuals and
corporations dealing with the U.N. Even though it is in the organization's
own interest to treat fairly with private parties, disputes sounding in both
contract and tort %ill inevitably arise. Except where waiver of immunity
or arbitration is specified in contracts, the U.N. can now deny any recourse
except through diplomatic channels. The proliferation of international or-
ganizations with at least partial immunity from suit has brought forth sug-
gestions for a coordinated system of international courts.n Pending possible
implementation of such proposals, the convention should require the U.N.
34. For jurisdictional immunities see note 23 supra. In general the came considerations
apply to the fiscal immunities of sovereign states. See 1 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 3. at 606,
n. 16.
35. See note 34 supra.
36. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE § 101 (1939); N. Y. Const. Art. XVI, § 1; N.Y. Tax Lav
§ 4(6); CoN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 1163; Cons. GE,. STAT. Surp. (1939) § 354e.
37. See Kuhn, United Nations Monetary Conference and the Inununity of International
Agencies (1944) 38 Am. J. Ie-r. L. 662, 666-7; Murdock, Post-War Interrational Jvdicial
Organization (1944) 38 Am. J. LeT. L. 706; Preliminary Report of the Commi-sion to Study
the Organization of Peace (1941) IrERqATiON-,'L CONcmLvTirxo No. 369 at 505.
Only states can be parties in cases before the International Court of Justice. Sr,,rcT
OF THE INTEMATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Art. 34, § 1. The statute of the Court would
therefore have to be amended if private parties w ere to have an appeal to the Court from
any set of subordinate international tribunals. It has been argued that such extension of
the Court's jurisdiction would give it "functions it could not perform without danger to its
original and proper functions," and a separate set of international courts for private inter-
national law has been proposed instead. Hostie, The Statute of M1e Pcrmancnl Court of Irter-
national Justice (1944) 38 Am. J. INeT. L. 407, 420-2.
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to set up a claims court or arbitral machinery for civil actions by aggrieved
private parties.
Under the International Organizations Immunities Act alien employees
of the U.N., employees of American citizenship, and representatives of for-
eign governments to the U.N. already enjoy immunity from suit and legal
process for "acts performed . . . in their official capacity and falling within
their functions" except as immunity is waived by the U.N. or the foreign
government." Exemption from federal income taxes on their salaries is
enjoyed by alien employees unconditionally;39 by representatives of foreign
governments on condition their governments grant reciprocal exemptions to
American officials serving abroad with international organizations;4 but
not at all by American employees.41 Alien employees and representatives of
foreign governments have exemption from customs duties on baggage and
personal effects brought with them on arrival in the United States but not
for anything imported subsequently;42 are not considered immigrants for
the purpose of entering the United States;4 and are exempt from regulations
for alien registration and fingerprinting and registration of foreign agents.
44
Proposals in the draft convention would result in extending immunity
from suit to the private acts of the U.N.'s top officials and resident represen-
tatives of members;45 including American employees in the exemption from
38. Pub. L. No. 291, supra note 5, Tit. I, § 7(b). The Secretary-General would have
the right and duty of waiving immunity for any employee even against the will of the em-
ployee whenever, in his opinion, it could be waived without prejudice to the United Nations.
Draft Convention, supra note 6, App. II, Art. V, § 20. It would likewise be considered the
right and duty of foreign governments to waive immunity for their representatives under
similar circumstances. Id. App. II, Art. IV, § 14.
39. Id. § 4(b) amending INT. REv. CODE § 116(h)(1) (1939).
40. Ibid.
41. INT. REv. CODE § 116 (h)(1) (1939) as amended by Pub. L. No. 291, see supra
note 5, Tit. I, § 4(b).
42. Pub. L. No. 291, supra note 5, Tit. I, § 3.
43. Id. § 7(c) and (d) amending the Immigration Act, 43 STAT 154 and 162 (1924) as
amended, 8 U. S. C. §§ 203 and 215 (1940). They must, however, obtain permits to enter
the country. CODE FED. REG. CuMf. SuPP. (1943) Tit. 8, §§ 175.42, 175.52.
44. Alien employees of the U.N. and representatives of foreign members are given the
same status as officers and employees of foreign governments. Pub. L. No. 291, supra note 5,
Tit. I, § 7(a). This means exemption from alien registration and fingerprinting. 54 STAT.
674 (1940), 8 U. S. C. § 453(b); CODE FED. REG. Cm. Sr'P. (1943) Tit. 8, § 170.1(h). Ex-
emption from registration as foreign agents is dependent on the employee's status and duties
being on record at the State Department. 52 STAT. 631 (1938) as amended by 56 STAT. 254
(1942), 22 U. S. C. § 613 (1943 Supp.); Agents of Foreign Principals and of Foreign Gov-
ernments, Dept. of State Publication No. 1370 (1939) Part I, Ch. IV, § 18.
45. The Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries-General, and resident representatives
of members would be accorded the privileges and immunities of diplomatic envoys. Draft
Convention, Art. V, § 25, App. II, Art. V, § 19. By statute and international law such
envoys have absolute immunity from criminal or civil suits. REv. STAT. §§ 4063-5 (1875),
22 U. S. C. §§ 252-4 (1940); see The Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch. 116, 138-9 (U. S.
1812); 1 OPPENEim, op. cit. supra note 7, at 616-18. There are eight Assistant Secretaries-
General. N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1946, p. 4, col. 4.
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federal income taxes on salaries;46 exempting U.N. salaries from state taxa-
tion;47 exempting all employees and representatives of foreign governments
from selective service; s and in recognition by the United States of U.N.
passports.49
Immunity from suit for U.N. employees in their capacity as agents appears
necessary to free the organization's activities from possible interference by
United States courts, for without it the organization's own immunity would
be ineffective. It seems that complete immunity from suit should be granted
as proposed to a handful of top U.N. officials since legal harrassment in these
cases, even for private acts, would hamper the organization. As in the case
of the organization, however, the counterpart of any immunity from suit in
American courts should be the establishment of alternative machinery for
efficacious settlement of disputes when immunity is not waived.
Delegations from member nations are functionally a part of the U.N., and
immunity for their personnel when acting in an official capacity is well de-
signed to insure independence in performing their duties. Extension of this
immunity to private acts as in the case of ambassadors would seem vise to
avoid embarrassment attendant on legal heckling based on political senti-
ment; whether such extension should be conditioned on reciprocity to
American delegations with international organizations is a matter of political
strategy. Since the U.N. has no power to bind personnel of foreign govern-
ments, any arbitration arrangements in the convention would not be binding
upon them; private parties must look to the State Department for protec-
tion in disputes with U.N. delegates from foreign sovereigns just as in the
case of diplomatic representatives to the United States.
There are two arguments for exempting alien employees' salaries from
federal income taxes, as already done, and from state taxes as proposed.
One is that exemption would enable the U.N. to pay less for personal serv-
ices. The other is that salaries of some employees might otherwise be subject
to double taxation-by the United States and the country of origin. Many
attempts have been made in the last twventy-five years to arrange inter-
46. Draft Convention, App. II, Art. V, § 18(b). The United States, not finally com-
mitted to any provisions of the draft convention, specifically reserved its position on thi
one.
47. lbid.
48. Id. App. II, Art. V, § 18(c). The United States has reserved its position on this
proposal in so far as it applies to American citizens.
49. Id. App. II, Art. VII.
50. See p. 785 supra. In the absence of waiver, American courts would presumably
decide whether an act was done in an employee's official capacity and, when the decision
went against the employee, proceed to judgment. A different situation might arise under
the proposed convention. A dispute between the United States and the U.N. would come
into being when the American court decided the jurisdictional issue against the employee
The U.N. might then waive his immunity, but could refer the question to a referee appointed
by the International Court. In such case, the American court would proceed to judgment
on the merits at the risk of colliding with a referee's decision which the United States Vas
committed by convention to respect.
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national agreements to prevent such double taxation, but the problem is
far from solution, and without the exemption granted by the United States,
would constitute a serious bar to the recruitment of a truly international
U.N. staff.5 ' Even with the United States exemption, employees will be
subject to taxation at different rates by different countries; U.N. personnel
policy therefore calls for paying equal net salaries after taxes.52
The United States has told the U.N. that it may not approve the proposal
to exempt salaries of American employees, presumably on the grounds that
its only justification lies in reducing U.N. costs and that a similar rationafe
has not been considered cogent enough in this country to exempt federal and
state salaries from income taxes.5 3 But the question should be viewed in the
light of U.N. proposals that all member nations exempt from taxation the
51. Without the United States exemption, alien employees spending more than ninety
days in this country would probably pay American taxes on at least that part of their sal.
aries considered, on a time basis, to have been earned here. INT. REV. CODE §§ 119(a)(3),
211(b)(1939). In most cases those working in the United States the year-round would
probably not be taxed also by the country of origin, since most countries base income taxes
on either the source of the income or the residence of the recipient-not on citizenship.
However, many employees, particularly technical experts or members of subordinate or-
ganizations, may work in this country only part of any year; and some of them would be
subject to taxation of their entire salaries by the country of "permanent" residence. For a
general discussion see Ke Chin Wang, International Double Taxation of Income:Relief
Through International Agreement 1921-45 (1945) 59 HARV. L. REV. 73. While generalization
is difficult in this field, actual experience of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration has shown double taxation to be a "major problem" in recruiting an inter-
national staff. UNRRA, Report of the Director-General to the Second Session of the Coun-
cil, Council II, Doc. 1, Sept. 1944, p. 80.
52. The potential inequality of net salaries for employees of the same class has been
heightened by the United States exemption; by virtue of it, some alien employees, resident
in this country the year-round, may pay no taxes at all on their salaries. The U.N.'s present
policy is to pay uniform salaries for each type of work and covenant in employment con-
tracts to reimburse employees for taxes. It is logical to suppose that reimbursement will
be based on the amount of taxes employees would pay if the salaries were their only income.
To simplify its book-keeping, the U.N. presumably will attempt to tabulate standard
sums for which it will be liable to each class of employees of each nationality. If account is
taken of varying exemptions claimable for different numbers of dependents, additional sub-
divisions will be necessary. Beyond that, other complications will arise under the tax laws,
of each country. With American employees, for example, it may be convenient to assume
that the standard 10% or $500 deduction will be taken and that no employee will file a joint
return; and since the amount of reimbursement for taxes on the original salary received
might itself be taxable and so on for each subsequent reimbursement, algebraic formulas
would be necessary if ultimate liability to each class of American employees were to be
calculated with mathematical fineness. Whatever procedure is adopted on these questions,
the U.N. will have to figure the amount of reimbursement each employee is entitled to; it
might be advisable for it to pay that amount directly to the taxing government so as to,
permit employees to claim a lump sum credit rather than have to file complicated individual
returns.
53. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938) (federal taxation of state salaries),
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939) (state taxation of federal
salaries). I-rr. REV. CODE § 22(a) (1939).
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compensation their nationals receive from the organization." General agree-
ment to do so would greatly simplify the bookkeeping problem of adjusting
net salaries to a multitude of tax laws, and if the United States is hesitant to
take the lead in establishing this principle, it might at least accept on condi-
tion that a certain number of other members follow suit.
There seems to be little objection to the other exemptions already granted
or proposed in the convention. In exempting on a reciprocal basis the
salaries of representatives of foreign governments to the U.N., the Interna-
tional Organizations Immunities Act merely puts these representatives on a
par with other employees of their governments in the United States.' Rec-
ognition of U.N. passports would be a recognition of the independence from
national ties of the organization and its officials; without it, requests for
passports would have to be channelled through an official's country of origin.
Exemption from selective service, liketax exemption, should be extended to
alien employees to encourage recruitment of an international staff but condi-
tioned on reciprocity for representatives of foreign governments; the argu-
ment for exempting American employees is that it would free them to some
extent from national bonds, and since the number involved should be rela-
tively small the United States has little to lose by granting it.'
III
Juridical concept of the permanent headquarters zone and the acquisition of
property. While neither the size nor exact location of the permanent head-
quarters zone have been determined,5 7 the U.N. seems to have veered away
from any desire to have a completely autonomous zone and to have in mind a
concept more similar to an oversize embassy than to a state-withn-a-state.P3
-Under the proposals in the draft convention, the zone would remain part of
54. The proposal which would exempt salaries of American employees is contained in
Appendix II of the draft U.N.-U. S. convention, which is the same as the General Conven-
tion already proposed by the U.N. to all member nations. See notes 6 and 46 sapra.
55. INT. REv. CODE § 116(h) (1939) prior to amendment by Pub. L. No. 291, supra
note 5, Tit. I.
56. The number of persons involved would be much less than involved in the propo-c-d
exemption of salaries of American employees from income taxes, since all employees would
draw salaries but only a few would be males meeting the age and physical requirement- for
selective service. Whether it would be politically wise for the U.N. to make itself a haven
from selective service, especially when the number of employees concerned would be sm all,
is another matter.
57. See note 2 supra.
58. This conclusion is implicit in the draft convention, which makes no mention of
autonomy but sets forth proposals for modifying in specific ways the preznt legal status of
the area which will be taken for the zone. Dr. Gabrilomitch, head of the original Site Inspac-
tion Group and a member of the new Headquarters Commission, has stated that an early
proposal for an "internationalized community" has been rejected. N. Y. Times, March 4,
1946, p. 1, cols. 6, 7. The subcommittee which worked out the first form of the draft conven-
tion decided not to take as a model any existing arrangement such as the Vatican City, the
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the United States and of the states in which it was located. 9 The U.N.
would have full title to the land and buildings in the zone; the right to take
water but not minerals from the subsoil; control of the air space; power to
regulate construction; and control over entry into the zone and conditions
under which persons might remain there.6" The U.N. would undertake not
to permit the zone to be used as a refuge for persons avoiding arrest or serv-
ice of process, and would receive a United States guarantee of unimpeded
transit to and from the zone for persons having official business there. 1
The United Nations would have authority to enact "regulations making,
provisions of an administrative character" for the zone.62 These regulations
would prevail over any inconsistent American laws, but in no event would
the basic freedoms guaranteed by the United States Constitution be abridged
within" the zone.63 Subject to such regulations, the ordinary American civil
and criminal law would apply in the zone.14 American courts would be bound
to give effect to any U.N. regulations to which the United States had
agreed, 5 and American officials would have to get the Secretary-General's
permission before entering the zone for service of process or other official
purposes. 6 Otherwise American courts would have the same jurisdiction
over acts done in the zone as they now have." If American citizens continued
to reside in the zone, they would retain suffrage and other rights of state and
national citizenship.6s
The U.N. would rely on American governments or corporations for most
of the public services needed by its headquarters. Although the organiza-
League of Nations, or the District of Columbia, but to fashion a sui generis regime based
on the functional needs of the U.N. Summary Record of Fifteenth Meeting, Committee 8,
Preparatory Commission, Dec. 20, 1945, U.N. Document PC/G/28 Supp. No. 8,
59. This is the clear implication of the lack of any provision to the contrary in the
Draft Convention. Federal and state officials have privately agreed with this interpretation.
60. Draft Convention, Art. II, §§ 3, 6-8, Art. III, §§ 10, 12. Either directly or by Im-
plication the convention would give the United Nations authority to establish any installa-
tion deemed necessary for its work and in particular its own radio station, a railroad station,
and an airport.
61. Id. Art. III, § 14, Art. IV, §§' 19-21. The U.N. would recognize the United States'
right to take such precautions as national security demanded in connection with transit
guarantees. Id. Art. IV, § 24.
62. Id. Art. III, § 16.
63. The Constitutional rights protected would be "personal liberty and . . . the basic
human freedoms of expression and worship." Ibid.
64. Id. Art. III, § 15.
65. American courts would "take cognizance of" all U.N. regulations but be obliged to
"inflict penalties for infraction" of only those previously agreed to. Id. Art. III, § 18.
66. Id. Art. III, § 13.
67. Id. Art. III, § 17. Jurisdiction of American courts would also be restricted by the
privileges and immunities enjoyed by the U.N. and its personnel, but this restriction would
be applicable regardless of the legal status of the headquarters zone.
68. Memorandum from Governor Baldwin to the Connecticut Commission on Inter-
governmental Cooperation, Feb. 27, 1946, p. 3. The draft convention was prepared on the
assumption that no private persons would live in the zone; the State Department says the
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tion will provide guards for its buildings," the United States would be re-
sponsible for furnishing internal police on request and for policing the bound-
aries of the zone.70 Other services,- such as electricity, water, gas, post,
telephone, telegraph, drainage, and refuse collection, the U.N. would pur-
chase on a contract basis from surrounding communities and utility com-
panies.7 ' The United States' responsibility would be limited to attempting
to insure that such services were made available at fair prices and that they
were not interrupted.7 2 If U.N. employees live within the zone 73 and want
to send their children to American public schools, either they or the organi-
zation will presumably have to negotiate the matter with neighboring com-
munities.
In discarding any idea of complete autonomy the U.N. sidesteps political
and constitutional questions which outright cession of territory would raise;T4
makes unnecessary the maintenance of separate local government; obviates
the continuing legal complications which autonomous jurisdiction would
provoke;-7 5 and yet secures the requisite physical independence for the per-
formance of its functions. Recognition of the U.N.'s power to issue adminis-
trative regulations for the zone would give the organization, but to a lesser
degree, the same type of "home rule" customarily enjoyed by municipalities.
The convention would make the United States responsible for (a) ex-
propriating and conveying to the U.N. all land and buildings within the
zone selected; 76 (b) vesting in the U.N. title to such additional land as it
final version will make "appropriate provisions as to the rights" of any private residents.
While the number of private residents remaining in the zone will probably depend on the
size of the area finally selected, U.N. officials have stated that residents vould be dsplaced
only where their properties would have to be demolished for construction of U.N. buildingo.
N. Y. Times, March 4, 1946, p. 1, cols. 6, 7.
69. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1946, p. 8, col. 5.
70. Draft Convention, Art. VI, §§ 26, 27. The United States would "cause to be pro-
vided" sufficient police; there seems to be nothing to prevent state or local police from b-ng
used.
71. Id. Art. VII, § 28.
72. The United States would "exercise all the powers . . . it possesses to ensure that
the zone. . . [is] supplied on equitable terms" with necessary public services. In case of
interruption by a strike or otherwise, the United States would take "those steps which it
would take in case of interruption . . . of these services to the ezsential department- of the
United States. . . ." Ibid.
73. There has been no definite indication whether the zone will include living facilities
and, if so, for how many persons. The terms of reference for the original Site Inspection
Group included a mention of dwellings within the zone. U.N. Document PC/ICH/W8
Rev. 1, Dec. 28, 1945, p. 3. More recent indications that the zone will be smaller than the
recommended 42-square miles cast doubt on this point.
74. The view has been expressed, however, that the United States could, by treaty,
constitutionally alienate territory. I WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIO z,%L L,%w or TraC UzNM-
STATEs (2d ed. 1929) 421-5.
75. For a discussion of comparable problems arising from exclusive federal jurisdiction
over federal enclaves vthin states, see Comment (193S) 38 COL. L. rm v. 123.
76. Draft Convention, Art. II, § 3, 4.
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requires in the future; and (c) insuring that neither the amenities of the
zone nor the purposes for which it is used are prejudiced by any use of ad-
jacent land. 8 The "fair price" of property conveyed to the U.N. would be
set off against future United States contributions. 9
While the U.N. will probably acquire by private purchase as much of the
zone as possible,80 a proclaimed intent to resort to condemnation if necessary
should reduce speculation, and its exercise would speed acquisition 81 and
insure clear titles."2 Condemnation by the federal government, authorized
by Congress, should encounter no insurmountable constitutional hurdles.
The only major issue would be whether use for U.N. headquarters is a
"public use" of the United States.8 3 The Supreme Court has never found
that a legislative determination that a use was public exceeded constitutional
77. The proposal extends to "such further land as may be required for . . . construct-
ing an airport, railway station, or radio telegraphic station or for such other purposes as
may be required by the United Nations. Id. Art. II, § 8. If such land were not contiguous
to the rest of the zone, the United States would guarantee unimpeded transit between the
parts. Id. Art. II, § 9.
78. Id. Art. VII, § 29.
79. Id. Art. II, § 5.
80. Such, at least, is the hope attributed to the State Department. Time, Feb. 18,
1946, p. 23, col. 1; Greenwich Time, Feb. 21, 1946, p. 1, col. 8.
81. The federal government may acquire title immediately on filing a Declaration of
Taking and depositing with the court the estimated compensation. 46 STAT. 1421 (1931),
40 U. S. C. § 258a-e (1940). Cf. N. Y. CONDEMNATION L. § 24 and CONN. GE N. STAT. STr'.
(1939) § 1310e, authorizing courts to order immediate entry upon condemnor's making a
deposit if the public interest would be prejudiced by delay.
82. Condemnation proceedings aim at final determination of the condemnor's obliga-
tions. United States v. Dunnington, 146 U. S. 338 (1892); Lenhoff, Developnment of the Con-
cept of Eminent Domain (1942) 42 COL. L. REv. 596, 630-7; see Duckett & Co. v. United
States, 266 U. S. 149, 151 (1924). Holders of interests wiped out by the condemnation are
considered to have equitable liens on the award. Matter of City of New York (Houghton
Ave.), 266 N. Y. 26, 193 N. E. 539 (1934). For different methods followed in apportioning
awards between holders of various estates, see (1943) 43 COL. L. REv. 137; (1943) 41 Micu.
L. REv. 1177.
83. Thie power of eminent domain is not expressly delegated to the federal government,
but "results from the powers that are given, and it is implied because of its necessity, or
because it is appropriate in exercising those powers." United States v. Gettysburg Electric
Ry., 160 U. S. 668, 681 (1896); Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 (1876). It may also
be implied from the Constitutional limitation that private property cannot be "taken for
public use without just compensation." U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V.
Doubts of the constitutionality of expropriation for the U.N. have been created by a
dictum that "eminent domain . . . is a right belonging to a sovereignty to take private
property for its own public uses and not for those of another." Kohl v. United States,
supra, at 373-4. But the Court was alluding to the practice of state governments in con-
demning land for the federal government and commenting on the absence of any necessity
for the state to do so.
If the taking is for a public use, its necessity and expediency are legislative, not judicial
questions. North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276 (1925); Georgia v. Chatta-
nooga, 264 U. S. 472 (1924).
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bounds,84 and in a recent decision held that "it is Congress' function to
decide what type of taking is for a public use." s As regards the United
Nations, moreover, a decision upholding the government's power would be
the only logical alternative to announcing that world peace is not a legiti-
mate public purpose of the United States.
Condemnation by the states should also be feasible. The limitations on
eminent domain in the New York and Connecticut constitutions are similar
to that in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,3 and
since tangible and intangible benefits should redound to the states from the
presence of U.N. headquarters, it should not be difficult to persuade their
courts that provision of land necessary for the headquarters would serve a
public purpose.
84. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, in United States ex rd. T. V. A. v. Welch,
66 Sup. Ct. 715, 720 (U. S. 1946).
85. United States ex rd. T. V.A. v. Welch, 66 Sup. Ct. 715,717 (U. S. 1946). The re-ult
would be the same if the courts held that condemnation, being an implementation of the
Charter or a convention, was a political question. See note 16 supra.
86. N.Y. CONST. Art. I § 7; CorN. CoNsT. Art. I, § 11. At an earlystage in the discus,
sion of the headquarters zone, it was believed that N. Y. STrrE L. § 50, which grants state
consent to the acquisition of land by the federal government for certain speified purpose2,
would have to be amended if the United States were to condemn land in New York for the
headquarters. The question of state consent, however, arises in connection with the transfer
of jurisdiction over state land to the federal government. Since there seems to be no dezire
for the United States to assume added jurisdiction over the zone, no statutory change ap-
pears necessary.
It has been thought that state exercise of eminent domain was subject to attack under
the due process clause of the United States Constitution as well as under the "public use"
limitations of state constitutions. The main support for this proposition is a dictum in
Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U. S. 439,446 (1930) in which the court said "It is well established
that in considering the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to cases of expropriation
of private property, the question what is a public use is a judicial one." While not directly
in point, United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Welch, 66 Sup. Ct. 715, 718 (U. S. 1946) casts doubt
on that view. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority, goes out of his way to cite the
dictum quoted supra, and points out that the decision rested on the ground that state law
had not authorized the questioned condemnation. It is believed there is no case in which
the Supreme Court has held invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment any condemnation
proceeding upheld by state courts as being for a public use. See Hairston v. Danville & W.
Ry., 205 U. S. 593, 607 (1908).
87. Recognition of the benefits expected to result to localities from the prezence of
U. N. headquarters appears in the eagerness with which American states and municipalitie5
attempted to persuade the organization to select a zone in their vicimity. By December,
1945, the U.N. had received over 40 invitations, and in that month sixteen communities
even sent deputations to London to argue their cases. Journal of the Preparatory Commis-
sion, Dec. 13, 1945; Report from Subcommittee on Hearings, Seventeenth Meeting, Com-
mittee 8, Preparatory Commission, Dec. 22, 1945.
There is of course no case directly in point, but dicta in leading cases in both New Yor:
and Connecticut show that the concept of "public use" in both states is flexible enough to
permit expropriation for the United Nations. E.g., "Over many years ... courts have
vainly attempted to define comprehensively the concept of a public use. . . . They have
found . .. that to formulate anything ultimate ... would, in an inevitably changing
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The easiest way for the U.N. to make sure that additional land will be
available for expansion and that use of adjacent land will not prejudice the
amenities of the zone would be to purchase or receive from the United States
at the outset, a surrounding belt of property. The cost of such an initial
purchase and the objections of surrounding communities make this procedure
impractical. Instead, the proposed commitments by the United States to
condemn additional land when required and to restrict immediately the
user of peripheral property should provide a workable alternative. However,
prompt planning is required to insure that construction of housing and other
facilities near the zone will not follow the haphazard pattern typical of Amer-
ican boom towns. The land may fall in several communities of two states.3
To prevent spot incursions by private interests in communities hungry for
tax revenue, something more than voluntary cooperation of local zoning
boards is needed. Knowledge that the federal government would act if
necessary should spur the states to action. At the least they should enact
coordinated zoning statutes for the entire area.s9 More satisfactory results
could be obtained by condemning the surrounding area and then leasing or
selling the excess land subject to restrictive covenants. The states would
thereby minimize the possibility of administrative variances defeating the
purpose of zoning laws and reap for themselves any increase in value of adja-
cent land.90 It is doubtful, however, whether such excess condemnation
could be followed under present judicial concepts of "public use." 91
world, be unwise if not futile." New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N. Y.
333,340, 1 N. E. (2d) 153, 155 (1936)." "Use . . .by everybody and anybody is one of the
abandoned universal tests of a public use." Id. at 342, 1 N. E. (2d) 155. "In this state it Is
settled that public use means public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive
of general benefit so that any appropriating of private property . . .for purposes of great
advantage to the community is a taking for public use." Board of Water Comm'rs of Hart.
ford v. Manchester, 87 Conn. 193, 204, 87 AUt. 870, 873 (1913), aff'd per curiam in Man-
chester v. Board of Water Comm'rs of Hartford, 241 U. S. 649 (1916).
88. See note 2 supra.
89. If two states are involved, the creation of a joint zoning board would facilitate uni-
form administration. Congressional consent to negotiation between the states and the
creation of such a board would undoubtedly be forthcoming. It is not certain that consent
would be necessary. See U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 10; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503
(1893); Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Intcr-
state Adjustments (1925) 34 Y AE L. J. 685, 749-54.
90. The states and local communities would get added tax revenue from any increase
in value of the land whether or not resort was had to excess condemnation. For European
experience in recouping increases in land values resulting from near-by public developments
see WALKER, URBAN BLIGHT AND SLUMS (1938) 336-7.
91. Excess condemnation has long been urged as an essential technique to assure the
full benefits of municipal developments such as slum clearance, construction of low-cost
housing, and widening of streets, where the condition of adjacent land threatens the success
of the projects. Even when practiced on a very limited scale to condemn odd remnants of
plots actually used for the development, it has often run into judicial disfavor in the absence
of specific Constitutional permission. Doctrinal opposition stems from "public use" clauses
of state constitutions, the argument being that taking for sale back to private parties is not
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for a public use regardless of the value to the municipality of the restrictive covenants im-
posed. The New York Constitution, Art. I, § 7(e) provides for a very limited exce:s con-
demnation; the Connecticut Constitution is silent on the subject. See, generally, CusuMz.,
Excuss CONDEmNATION (1917) 275-310; Comment (1946) 46 COL. L. Rnv. 103; Comment
(1942) 27 XVAsH. U. L. Q. 466; Comment (1932) 18 VA. L. REv. 5S0.
See note 86 supra for an indication that excess condemnation, if upheld by state courts,
would not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U. S. 439 (1930), cited therein, involved excss condemnation
under an Ohio statute.
